Venezuela’s extensive natural resources have reemerged within Washington’s strategic agenda, with its potential mineral reserves now portrayed as matters of national significance, although specialists caution that transforming these aspirations into tangible results is considerably more intricate than political discourse implies.
When Donald Trump declared that U.S. companies would gain access to Venezuela’s oil reserves, attention quickly expanded beyond crude. Inside policy circles, the conversation has increasingly included minerals, metals and even rare earth elements believed to exist beneath Venezuelan soil. These materials are essential to industries ranging from defense and aerospace to clean energy and consumer technology, making them a focal point of U.S. national security discussions.
Yet while the idea of tapping Venezuela’s broader resource base may appear attractive on paper, specialists caution that it is fraught with uncertainty. The scale, quality and economic viability of many of these resources remain unclear, and the political, security and environmental obstacles surrounding extraction are formidable. As a result, most analysts agree that even an aggressive push by Washington would be unlikely to deliver meaningful relief to America’s strained supply chains in the near or medium term.
Strategic interest beyond oil
For decades, Venezuela has been synonymous with oil. Its proven crude reserves rank among the largest in the world, shaping its economy and its fraught relationship with the United States. However, recent geopolitical shifts have expanded the definition of “strategic resources” far beyond hydrocarbons. Critical minerals and rare earth elements are now seen as indispensable inputs for advanced manufacturing, renewable energy systems and military hardware.
Officials within the administration have signaled an awareness that Venezuela’s value may extend beyond petroleum. According to Reed Blakemore of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, there is recognition that the country may hold a wider array of natural assets. However, he and others emphasize that acknowledging potential is not the same as being able to exploit it.
The challenges associated with mining and exporting minerals in Venezuela are, in many respects, more daunting than those facing the oil sector. While oil extraction relies on existing infrastructure and established global markets, mineral development would require extensive geological surveys, massive capital investment and long-term stability — conditions that Venezuela currently lacks.
Uncertainty beneath the surface
One of the central problems facing any attempt to develop Venezuela’s mineral resources is the absence of reliable data. Years of political upheaval, economic crisis and international isolation have left large gaps in geological information. Unlike countries with transparent reporting and active exploration programs, Venezuela’s subsurface wealth is poorly mapped and often discussed in speculative terms.
The United States Geological Survey does not include Venezuela among the nations with verified rare earth element reserves, a gap that does not confirm their absence but rather highlights the limited extent of validated data. Specialists suggest that Venezuela could contain deposits of minerals like coltan, which provides tantalum and niobium, along with bauxite, a source of aluminum and gallium. U.S. authorities classify all these metals as critical minerals.
Past Venezuelan leaders have made bold claims about these resources. In 2009, former president Hugo Chávez spoke publicly about large coltan discoveries, portraying them as a national treasure. Later, under Nicolás Maduro, the government established the Orinoco Mining Arc, a vast region designated for mineral exploration and extraction. In practice, however, the project became synonymous with environmental degradation, illegal mining and the presence of armed groups.
Security, governance and environmental risks
Mining is by nature a highly disruptive pursuit that depends on consistent governance, clear and enforceable rules, and assurances of long-term security. In Venezuela, such foundations are largely missing. Many areas thought to hold significant mineral reserves are isolated and poorly administered, leaving them exposed to unlawful activities.
Armed groups and criminal networks are deeply entrenched in illicit gold mining across parts of the country, according to multiple independent assessments. These groups often operate with little oversight, contributing to violence, deforestation and pollution. Introducing large-scale, legitimate mining operations into such an environment would be extraordinarily difficult without sustained improvements in security and rule of law.
Rare earth mining presents additional challenges. Extracting and processing these elements is energy-intensive and can generate hazardous waste if not properly managed. In countries with strict environmental standards, these risks translate into higher costs and longer project timelines. In Venezuela, where regulatory enforcement is weak, the environmental consequences could be severe, further complicating any attempt to attract responsible international investors.
As Blakemore has noted, even under optimistic assumptions, bringing Venezuelan minerals to global markets would be a “much more challenging story” than oil development. Without credible guarantees on safety, environmental protection and policy stability, few companies would be willing to commit the billions of dollars required for such projects.
China’s dominance in processing and refining
Even if U.S. firms managed to clear the obstacles involved in extraction, they would still face another looming bottleneck: processing. Obtaining raw materials represents only the initial phase of the supply chain, and when it comes to rare earths, the refinement and separation stages are both the most technologically demanding and the most capital‑intensive.
Here, China maintains a powerful lead. The International Energy Agency reported that, in 2024, China was responsible for over 90% of the world’s refined rare earth output. This overwhelming position stems from decades of government backing, assertive industrial strategies and relatively relaxed environmental oversight.
As Joel Dodge from the Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator has noted, China’s dominant position in processing grants it significant industrial and geopolitical influence, and although rare earths may be extracted in other regions, they are frequently routed to China for refinement, which further consolidates Beijing’s pivotal place within the supply chain.
This reality complicates Washington’s strategic calculations. Securing access to raw materials in Venezuela would do little to reduce dependence on China unless parallel investments were made in domestic or allied refining capacity. Such investments would take years to materialize and face their own regulatory and environmental hurdles.
Strategic importance of critical minerals for national security
The United States currently classifies 60 minerals as critical because of their vital role in economic and national security, a roster that covers metals like aluminum, cobalt, copper, lead and nickel, along with 15 rare earth elements including neodymium, dysprosium and samarium, all of which are woven into everyday technologies such as smartphones, batteries, wind turbines and electric vehicles, and remain indispensable for sophisticated weapons systems.
Although their name suggests otherwise, rare earth elements are actually relatively plentiful within the Earth’s crust. As geographer Julie Klinger has noted, the real challenge stems not from limited supply but from the intricate processes required to extract and process them in ways that are both economically feasible and environmentally responsible. This nuance is frequently overlooked in political debates, resulting in overstated assumptions about the strategic importance of undeveloped deposits.
U.S. lawmakers have grown increasingly troubled by the nation’s dependence on overseas suppliers for these materials, especially as tensions with China escalate, and efforts have emerged to bolster mining and processing within the country. Yet these domestic initiatives encounter extended timelines, local resistance and rigorous environmental assessments, so rapid outcomes remain improbable.
Venezuela’s limited role in the near future
Against this backdrop, hopes that Venezuela might become a major source of critical minerals seem unattainable, as experts at BloombergNEF and various research organizations highlight a mix of obstacles that sharply limit the nation’s outlook: geological information that is outdated or missing, insufficient qualified workers, pervasive organized crime, long-standing underinvestment and a policy landscape marked by volatility.
Sung Choi of BloombergNEF has argued that, despite Venezuela’s theoretical geological potential, it is unlikely to play a meaningful role in global critical mineral markets for at least the next decade. This assessment reflects not only the technical challenges of mining, but also the broader institutional weaknesses that deter long-term investment.
For the United States, this means that ambitions to diversify supply chains cannot rely on Venezuela as a quick fix. Even if diplomatic relations were to improve and sanctions eased, the structural barriers would remain formidable.
Geopolitical dynamics versus economic realities
The renewed focus on Venezuela’s resources illustrates a recurring tension in global economic policy: the gap between geopolitical aspiration and economic feasibility. From a strategic perspective, the idea of accessing untapped minerals in the Western Hemisphere is appealing. It aligns with efforts to reduce dependence on rival powers and to secure inputs vital for future industries.
However, resource development is governed by practical realities that cannot be wished away. Mining projects require stable institutions, transparent regulations and long-term commitments from both governments and companies. They also demand social license from local communities and credible environmental safeguards.
In Venezuela’s case, these foundations have been steadily weakened by decades of political upheaval, and restoring them would call for long-term reforms that reach far beyond what any single trade or energy initiative could achieve.
A sober assessment of expectations
Ultimately, experts urge caution in interpreting political statements about Venezuela’s resources. While the country’s underground wealth is often portrayed as vast and transformative, the evidence suggests a far more constrained outlook. Oil remains Venezuela’s most clearly defined asset, and even there, production faces significant obstacles.
Minerals and rare earth elements add another layer of complexity, with uncertain quantities, high extraction costs and global supply chains dominated by established players. For the United States, securing these materials will likely depend more on diversified sourcing, recycling, technological innovation and domestic capacity building than on opening new frontiers in politically unstable regions.
As the worldwide competition for critical minerals accelerates, Venezuela will keep appearing in strategic debates, yet its influence will probably stay limited without substantial on-the-ground reforms; aspiration by itself cannot replace the data, stability, and infrastructure that form the core of any effective resource strategy.